Pascal, Transcendentalist? Revisited
I was reading Wittgenstein’s On Certainty to wind down after working on my biology presentation, and hit proposition 100: “The truths which Moore says he knows, are such as, roughly speaking, all of us know, if he knows them.” It struck me that this was a good definition of transcendental truths (on which, up to this point in OC, Wittgenstein has been critical). It then struck me that my previous posts on Pascal and Thoreau were even more confused than I had previously thought.
Some of my background in understanding transcendentalism comes from reading Thoreau. This reading has been done outside of an academic setting and unfortunately largely in a vacuum. Some of my background in understanding transcendentalism comes from reading Kant. Most of that consisted in reading his Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals in my Ethics class last year. It was the Kantian component (both in my background, and in terms of completeness of idea) that was missing from my thinking on Pascal.
Of course Pascal was a transcendentalist. He was a christian apologist! He believed in a transcendent higher power, with truths that, roughly speaking, all of us (could) know. In a very Kantian sense, Pascal was a transcendentalist. At least part of my confusion came about because of a definitional issue.
At least my view was confused in an interesting way. I think the root of of my difficulty was in trying to link Pascal’s (and Kant’s) transcendentalism to Thoreau’s. Thoreau’s transcendentalism carries with it a lot of cultural baggage, to which I may be particularly susceptible. I haven’t had the opportunity to have this baggage exposed to me in a conversational setting, and it now seems to have lurked in the background, obfuscatory. If I ever get back to linking Pascal to Thoreau, I’ll need to more closely examine what differences there may be between his transcendentalism and Kant’s as well as why I think those differences exist.